From the operator`s point of view, a cap on liability is desirable and, when negotiating joint enterprise agreements on the basis of the OGUK agreement, consideration should be given to the question of whether limits should be imposed on losses or damage caused by the deliberate delay of the operator. Under the OGUK agreement, non-responsibility and compensation to the operator do not apply to losses or damages resulting from or resulting from the operator`s intentional misconduct. The OGUK agreement defines “intentional misconduct” such as: In early 2012, the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) released a new version of its form joint operating agreement (JOA) model. The new 2012 JOA updates the existing 2002 JOA. It was first published in 1990 and revised in 1995, 2002 and now in 2012. The drafting committee of the 2012 JOA (composed of 180 international oil negotiators) began its work in December 2007 and took more than four years to complete the 2012 JOA. As oil and gas deposits have matured, host governments are increasingly focusing on the need to ensure that offshore facilities are dismantled. This is also a problem for joint ventures, as they inevitably have to bear the costs of such dismantling. The main objective of the new provisions of the 2012 JOA is to place greater emphasis on decommissioning and to ensure that a partner does not bear a disproportionate share of these costs. That`s why the 2012 JOA is particularly expanding the decommissioning security options contained in the 2002 JOA.
However, the specific conditions of each JOA should be thoroughly assessed and modified according to the competence, circumstances and economic, legal and technical requirements of the companies involved and the assets involved. Consecutive damage The last important difference between the approaches to the agreements is the treatment of the operator`s liability for consecutive damages. The OGUK agreement expressly provides that the operator is not liable for any subsequent damage that may be caused to a joint venture company resulting from the failure to perform or improperly perform its obligations as an operator. Each joint venture is required to compensate the operator for and against this liability. The exclusion characterizes the act as intentional misconduct and thus reduces the possibility of such an act within the meaning of the OGUK agreement. As a result, the operator is more likely to avail itself of the disclaimer and be compensated by the parties to the joint venture under the OGUK agreement. Introduction Two standard operator behaviour agreements Operator responsibility The agreement explicitly defines certain categories of losses that, for the purposes of the agreement, are considered to be included in the definition of “loss of consequence,” generally indirect or consecutive damage. The aim is to: the operator must develop and implement an HSE plan to ensure a safe and reliable execution of operations, to prevent the significant and unintentional effects of personal safety and health, property and the environment, and to comply with HSE legislation. The operator must also implement the HSE plan in accordance with HSE laws and standard practice and conduct joint operations in accordance with the HSE plan.
“Loss or damage, expenses, expenses or debts… releases of hydrocarbons, pollutants or other impurities into or on any environment (such as land, surface water, groundwater and/or air) resulting from [the agreement] or related to [the agreement] or operations under the agreement, including one of the following measures: (i) damage or damage or destruction of natural resources or property; (ii) the costs of controlling, cleaning and eliminating pollution; (iii) The costs of restoring natural resources; and (iv) fines, penalties or other assessments. The Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) joint operating agreement (JOA) model was first adopted in 1990 and has been the subject of a series of subsequent revisions.